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Legal Education and Large Law Firms: Delivering
Legality or Solving Problems
BRYANT G. GAIRTH*
The large law firm dominates debate and analysis of the major issues
facing the legal profession today.' To some extent, this dominance is

appropriate. Large law firms are the most successful institutional component
of the American legal profession according to the criteria of economic
prosperity, proximity to the corridors of economic and political power, and
the influence exerted on the legal profession generally. This success makes
it especially appropriate to focus on large firms when discussing such issues
as the position of women and minorities in the profession.2 From an
academic perspective, another subject may seem even more important-the
increasingly close connection between the large corporate law firms and the
law schools.3 Opinions may differ on the desirability of that phenomenon,
* Dean and Professor, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington.
1. For example, the literature on the rise and decline of professional values, including the
value of independence, tends to emphasize the crucial role of the large law firm. According
to Robert Gordon, "[Tihe ideology of lawyers as a separate estate in society originated with
and has tended most to flourish around the elite bar." Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers,
68 B.U.L. REv. 1, 31 (1988). See also Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice
of Law, 41 VANn. L. Rnv. 717 (1988); Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J.
151 (1987); Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1094 (1988)
(Prosperous lawyers can exercise more discretion because "lawyers will have to balance their
legitimate financial concerns with their commitment to a just distribution of legal services.").
The era of attention to "social change through law" both in the United States and abroad
highlighted the power and approach of the "first rate metropolitan lawyer." J. GARDNER,
LEGAL ImPERIALiSM 37 (1980) (quoting a speech by Justice Douglas). Recent attention to changes
in the market and increased competition in the United States and in the other centers of
commerce and industry bring the U.S. large law firm and comparable entities elsewhere into
focus. Flood, Megalaw in the U. K.: Professionalism or Corporatism?A PreliminaryReport,
64 IND. L.J. 567 (1989).
2. See Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 ST.
L. Rav. 1163, 1178-79
(1988).
3. See generally Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors 11: Some
Notes on Two Recent Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 506 (1982). The
relationship between the firms and the schools has been changing. Probably the fit between
the large firms and the law schools has grown much closer in recent years simply because the
law firms have raised their salaries in order to attract a larger number of graduates and fuel
the incredible growth dynamic that characterizes the large law firms. One could simply celebrate
this phenomenon, but, unlike many business schools, no law school would define educational
success solely according to the market as reflected in the starting salaries of its graduates. Law
schools do, however, like to report salary figures as well as the percentage of students with
jobs at graduation, the number of firms who come to the school to recruit, and the number
of places where students go to practice, and all of those figures relate directly to recruiting
by the large law firms. If we wish, we could trace the connections even further. Certainly
there are counter trends, but the new interest in public interest alternatives may reflect an
upsurge in student concern, or it may be largely a symbolic act to allow the illusion that
today's students can resist the pressures to join the large law firms.
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and certainly an academic institution cannot define itself according to the
priorities of a privileged segment of a diverse profession. Nevertheless, a
close connection between large firms and law schools is inevitable, and it
necessarily raises some basic questions about curriculum and teaching. One
especially timely question is how the general teaching program at the law
schools promotes or hinders certain aspects of the professionalism of the
large firm lawyers. Not everyone is precise about what professionalism
means, but there seems to be a growing literature suggesting that we need
more of whatever it is.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's remarks at our building dedication in 19874
called for more research and reflection by law schools about the changes
taking place in the profession and especially in the large law firms. He
expressed concern about a decline in what he deemed to be certain essential
features of professionalism, including lawyers' involvement in public service.
The American Bar Association's Report on Professionalism outlines similar
themes in its lament on the rise of commercialism.' It tries to find ways to
involve the law schools in the revitalization of the profession, but the
conclusions about law schools are limited: Professors should serve as role
models; ethics and professionalism should be taught. Such proposals are
fine as far as they go, but they avoid the controversial question of how the
basic teaching program itself builds or hinders particular ideals of professionalism. One of these ideals is that of "independent professional judgment," which can be defined in a way that links it both to the values of
the legal system and to an ethic of personal integrity. A big question is
whether law schools can help to cultivate this ideal and bolster it in large
law firms.
A discussion initiated at the Law School's 1988 symposium on large law
firms by two leading practitioners, Bryant Danner of Latham and Watkins
and James Fitzpatrick of Arnold and Porter, 6 provides a useful way to
frame the issue. Each emphasized a different role for the law schools in
preparing students to practice effectively in large law firms. Danner emphasized the traditional first year curriculum and the skills of case analysis
and legal reasoning. Fitzpatrick, reflecting in part the entrepreneurial approach of his firm, emphasized "problem-solving" and the case method
used in business schools rather than that of traditional law schools. The
approaches are directed to the problem of how best to promote craft, not

4. Rehnquist, supra note 1.
5. AMRICANJ BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM,

". .
. . IN THE SPIRIT
OF A PUBIC SERvIcE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLINo OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986).

6. See generally Danner, Looking at Large Law Firms-Any Role Left for the Law
Schools? 64 IND. L.J. 447 (1989); Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law
Firms by the End of the Century, 64 IND. L.J. 461 (1989).

1989]

LEGAL EDUCATION

independent professional judgment. The standards for craft, however, cannot be separated from the troubling issue of professionalism.
The two educational approaches correspond with two ways to approach
legal practice. One approach is "delivering legality" through the dissemination of law and legal principles to clients. The other is the "delivering
solutions" approach of the problem solver.7 Neither approach to technique
is necessarily more client-centered or "adversarial" than the other. They
differ on another scale-what values to push in giving legal advice. Danner
and Fitzpatrick have good reasons for linking one or the other approach
to success in the large law firm setting.' The question here, however, is not
what makes for success, but how a certain kind of success structures our
central professional values. We can explore that question through the
dichotomy of delivering legality versus problem solving. This important
dichotomy, found in both teaching and practice, can highlight the unsettled
issues and suggest some approaches that might fruitfully be taken.

I.

DELVERING LEGALITY

The "delivering legality" approach 9 has a respectable pedigree in the
canons of legal ethics:
The most effective realization of the law's aims often takes place in the
attorney's office, where litigation is forestalled by anticipating its outcome, where the lawyer's private counsel takes the place of public force.
Contrary to popular belief, the compliance with the law thus brought
about is not generally lip-serving and narrow, for by reminding him of
its long-run costs the lawyer often deters his client from a course of
conduct technically permissible under existing law, though inconsistent
with its underlying spirit and purpose.' 0
As captured well in this often-cited quotation, the delivering legality approach has a number of interesting features. It creates in the first place a
rather appealing picture of the law and the lawyer. The lawyer, trained to
establish the principles and goals underlying a particular law, advises the
client about just those principles and goals. The lawyer's power is used to
tame the client and bring the client within those socially beneficial purposes.
Delivering legality civilizes the client through wise counsel grounded in legal
principles. According to this approach, the lawyer's independent professional
judgment derives from the ability to ascertain and apply neutral legal
principles and goals.

7. While this dichotomy differs from that of William Simon, supra note 1, Simon's
category of "regulatory" lawyer has many similarities to the "legality" model.
8. See Danner, supra note 6; Fitzpatrick, supra note 6.
9. See generally Galanter, Delivering Legality: Some Proposals for the Direction of
Research, 11 LAW & Soc'y REv. 225 (1976).
10. American Bar Association Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Professional
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958) (reprinted in
MODEL CODE OF PROFssIoNA. RESPONsmrLTY EC 7-8 note 19 (1981)).
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This approach has considerable appeal, but it is grounded in a particular
social context. First, it is closely intertwined with the regulatory state. The
emphasis is on compliance with the principles of the law even if the client
could be shown ways to avoid compliance. It is assumed without question
that the avoidance of regulation increases long-run costs." Evasion of the
law through lip service is characterized without analysis as costly in the
long run. The idea that "private counsel takes the place of public force"
clearly extends the regulatory state instead of pushing public force away in
the interests of private initiative. Delivering legality, in short, is biased
toward regulation.
The quotation tends also to support "no" as a particularly valued outcome
of legal advice. The lawyer deters the client from a course of conduct that
is inconsistent with the spirit of a law or regulation. The great lawyer
essentially says,
I can think of a way that you could accomplish your goal that would
technically be legal, but it would violate the purposes of the legal
regulation. Moreover, there are costs of going against those purposes.
In particular, there will be embarrassment and a certain ill will generated
against you when others find out that you have exploited a technicality
not meant to allow you to proceed.

Thus the assumptions are that legal regulation ought to be implemented,
and that hesitation and caution are essentially costless outcomes. The ethical
lawyer is characterized above all by a courageous fidelity to legal principles
and aims.
The same approach applies to the resolution of disputes. The deliverer
of legality advises the client as to who is right and who is wrong according
to the law. That does not mean the lawyer avoids negotiated settlements,
but the law casts a definite shadow over any negotiated solution. Negotiations take place as if the parties are trying to predict what the outcome
would be at trial. The public policy of the delivering legality tradition thus
finds its way into the model of the negotiating process. Again, wise counsel
helps to implement the principles and aims of the legal system.
II.

DELrvERNG SOLUTIONS

For obvious reasons, delivering legality seems a little anachronistic as a
professional ideology in an era of deregulation. The "delivering solutions"
11. Another vivid example is MODEL CODE OF PRoFESSIoNAL REsPoNsIILTrrY EC 7-8 (1981),
which notes that "it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead
to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility
of harsh consequences that might result from assertion of legally permissible positions." Again,
only the consequences of avoidance are emphasized. Compliance or legality is assumed to be
moral and economically good.
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approach, however, rejects the bias toward regulation and the respect for
the conservative "no." It focuses attention on "yes" as the preferred
outcome of first-rate legal advice. 12 The paramount goal is to find a way
to unleash private initiative in the face of governmental regulation. The
astute lawyer does not find ways to discourage clients from going ahead
because of some asserted public policy, but rather treats the governmental
regulation as a challenge to be overcome on the way to consummation of
a deal. The emphasis is less on courage and more on creative problem
solving.
The deliverer of solutions seeks instrumental goals that are not necessarily
rooted in legality. The goal may be to satisfy the aims of a client, whether
it is to win a particular fight or to make peace and get along with the
business or social arrangement. The defining poiht, however, is that the
law or legal regulation is simply a potential obstacle to be overcome or
circumvented-or even used where appropriate. Whether making deals or
resolving disputes, the two approaches lead to pronounced differences.
The differences in practice can be seen in the setting of a hypothetical
merger between two large corporations that traditionally have competed
with each other. 3 Many kinds of legal advice are possible. An example in
the delivering legality tradition would be advice that the merger is probably
legal, but is inconsistent with the spirit of competition that the antitrust
laws were meant to foster. The pure problem solver, on the other hand,
might advise that, while the letter of the law clearly prohibits the transaction,
the chances of enforcement are very small and the potential sanctions are
less than the expected value of the transaction. There are several kinds of
advice between these two extremes, but these examples illustrate the tendency
toward different outcomes. The first approach inserts the presumed policies
of the law into the transaction. The second finds a way to keep the law
and its policies away.
The example suggests several important implications. First, the delivering
solutions approach can be identified with deregulation rather than regulation. There is no reason for lawyers concerned only with solutions to advise
their clients that the transaction should be modified for the purposes of
regulatory legal principles. It is true that the lawyer might think there are
negative long-run consequences that might occur from saying yes, but there
may also be negative long-run consequences from saying no. The lawyer
certainly can and should evaluate such positive and negative consequences,

12. See R. FIsHER & W. URY, GErMno TO YES (1981) (reflecting a similar approach to
problem solving). For an example of "yes" lawyering, see P. HEYiANN & L. LmaMAN, THE
SOCIAL REspoNsIBILIrs OF LAwY Rs: CASE STuDuns 106 (1988).
13. Gordon, supra note 1, at 26-29, and Simon, supra note 1, provide much more
sophisticated analyses of the options available to the lawyer-counselor.
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but regulatory policy is not given any special weight in the problem-solving
balance of these consequences.
Second, the emphasis on solutions rather than legality can be seen as a
deprofessionalizing approach. It de-emphasizes the law and makes equally
important the other potential costs and benefits of the transaction. It is
helpful to know what risks the law might create, but those risks are not
counted any differently than the risks of the economic marketplace. The
boundaries between the professions are blurred, as is any boundary presumed
to exist between business and profession. The professions can compete for
leadership in tying together the various forms of advice and information
that are required to evaluate a given transaction. The individual or organization that "quarterbacks" the transaction earns more money and gains
more influence. The legal profession has no special claim to preeminence
in this kind of environment with this kind of orientation.
The emphasis on solutions also has an impact on the professional marketplace. A law firm that stubbornly insists that legal principles and the
purposes of various laws counsel against a potentially profitable transaction
will have some trouble attracting business. More aggressive law firms will
find ways to satisfy the aims of their business clients. It may also be that
more aggressive advisers from other professions will have success competing
against law firms. An accounting firm that provides accurate tax advice
even further removed from legal principles than solution-oriented law firms
may prove especially successful. Pressures to minimize concerns of legality,
in short, have an impact throughout the market in business advice and
dispute resolution. Lawyers, one can argue, had better learn to play well
in this competitive market, or the business community will rely primarily
on advisors able to find the best economic solution to their problems.
Perhaps the concern for legality is a needless obstacle to large law firm
success.

III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM:
REVIVAL OR ABANDONMENT OF LEGALITY

Legal education is inevitably affected by what can be seen as a trend
toward deregulation and de-professionalization. Legal educators concerned
with a professional ideal grounded in legal principles face an apparent
dilemma. On the one hand, they want law graduates to be successful in the
era of deregulation. Success may require that the law schools teach more
in the tradition of business schools with an orientation toward the bottom
line rather than toward legal principles and purposes. The specifically legal
component of legal education would focus mainly on developing plausible
arguments and assessing the costs of a plausible argument that does not
work. Ascertaining traditional legality would still matter as one aspect of a
lawyer's skills, but it would bring no special commitment. The crucial part
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of the curriculum would integrate that legal component with the skills of
problem solving so that lawyers would be able to quarterback the large
business transactions. They would learn to mobilize and draw upon the
skills of accountants, architects, engineers, and business people, who would
play other positions on the successful transactional team.
That apparent recipe for success is troubling for educators who would
like to preserve the independent voice of the legal profession. Legality
concerns give a basis for that voice. One response might be to seek to
revitalize the teaching program in order to rebuild a consensus about legal
principles and goals, and to rekindle the role of the lawyer as a relatively
cautious adviser and strong protector of the principles of legality. Such a
reform program, however, goes directly against the grain of recent events.
The notion that legal principles and purposes can be divined and taught
has the ring of fantasy. Few today believe that the antitrust laws, for
example, provide a clear set of principles in the abstract. Rather, the
principles depend on an understanding that derives from political and social
contexts and opinions. In short, no one will be fooled if we spend all our
reform energies trying to revive a view of legal education that we identify
14
so strongly with the nineteenth century.

A respectable body of opinion, moreover, would consider lawyering to
be at its finest and most professional if it sought only to find a way to say
"yes" to economically rational transactions."5 Law schools that push a
somewhat anachronistic vision of legality will thus not only have trouble
gaining a consensus on which legality, but also will create controversy over
the entire enterprise of promoting legality.
The legality ideal cannot be revived as a means to promote independent
professional values in the large law firms. It simply overlooks too much in
the name of a contested set of principles. The delivering solutions approach,
in addition, has merit of its own. It develops important skills to help the
firms gain a competitive advantage in the large transactions so important
to their economic prosperity. Nonetheless, we are still left wondering about
the implications for the legal profession. The question remains whether the
value of independent professional judgment is worth anything, and, if so,
what might be done to strengthen it in today's world.

IV.

BETWEEN REvivAL AN)

ABANDONMENT

The problem is easy to state. It is increasingly difficult for law schools
to cultivate traditional professional values in large law firms. Legality asks

14. See generally Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983).
15. See, e.g., Fried, The Trouble With Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1984, § 6 (Magazine),

at 56.
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too much, and problem solving asks very little. Before giving up, however,
we should consider some alternatives between revival and abandonment of
the delivering legality paradigm. One possibility is to help students identify
what is truly fundamental in our legal system. Perhaps students can be
persuaded that delivering legality applies to some core of legal values, such
as due process and the right to be heard.
Law professors have some difficulty teaching core values.16 Brilliant
teaching is irreverent.17 The best post-realist teachers are often masters at
showing students that their most cherished beliefs are simply a matter of
opinion or supportable only by some more or less plausible arguments that
could be countered by other more or less plausible arguments. There are
limits, however, even for those who cultivate irreverence. Very few professors, if any, will play devil's advocate for slavery. The argument for slavery
is an affront to uncontestable legal values. Perhaps the range of the
uncontestable goes further. The basics of due process are still central to
any vision of our legal system. Law teachers should ask what other fundamentals are essential to the legal profession, and they should teach that
such fundamentals have a special place in professional legal advice.
How far professors should go in this direction is subject to some debate,
and this brief article cannot begin to do it justice. I would like, however,
to promote two professional norms as basic. One is the duty to provide
legal services to those who cannot afford them. Not all support this idea,
but the organized bar expresses it at all appropriate occasions." The second
is the obligation not to counsel ways for clients to get away with violations
of the law. Returning to the antitrust example, a teacher could instruct
students in several ways. Assuming a situation where the merger was clearly
illegal, a lawyer might advise the client that illegality can safely be ignored
because it would not be prosecuted by state authorities lacking sufficient
resources. Such advice is not necessarily immoral by any external (nonlegal/professional) standards of morality. Non-enforcement may occur because the executive branch wishes to promote mergers and acquisitions.
Non-lawyers can see very well that a merger may be socially desirable from
the point of view of the executive branch, even if it technically violates the
law. The astute problem solver might thus advise how to allow the "illegal"
merger to take place. Legality in this manner counts for nothing. Such
advice is economically and practically sound, but I do not think lawyers
can ethically provide it.
16. See generally Rueschemeyer, Doctors and Lawyers: A Comment on the Theory of
Professors, 1 CAN. REv. OF Soc. & ANTHR. 17, 19-22 (1964) (difficulty of defining central
values of the legal profession in contrast to that of the medical profession).
17. See D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL ED. 461 (1987).

18. For an interesting expression of concern about the corporate bar's commitment, see
Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results? 167 ANNALs 177 (1933).
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Prevailing professional norms oppose that unequivocal rejection of legality. The lawyer should not advise how to disobey the law, even if a
respectable argument can be made that it would be in the client's best
interests. 9 This professional norm, which I think we ought to continue to
support, biases the legal. profession toward legality. It may not be rational
economically, but it should temper the advice of the problem solver in some
situations. Law schools should cultivate this aspect of the legal profession
even when it inhibits rational economic decision making. That does not
mean lawyers must try to line up clients behind the principles and aims of
laws, but it does mean that clients must not be advised how to flout the
law in the name of profit. Our independent professional judgment, in short,
should be biased somewhat toward legality even for a lawyer primarily
focused on problem solving.
There are two strong reasons for law schools to encourage this kind of
independent professional judgment. The first is professional survival. If we
depreciate legality such that it collapses into just another variable in the
equation, it is difficult to make any special claims for the legal profession
as worthy of special protection by the state. Whatever lawyers might be
tempted to do to support themselves and their practices, they will have
problems if the law part becomes too small. Lawyers as a group have a
stake in legal regulation and the implementation of legal principles. It may
hurt the business of the large law firms to insist on a professional norm
against counseling a knowing violation of the law, and to take the norm
more seriously than simply "perhaps an argument can be made." But the
long term survival of the legal profession is linked to a serious approach
to law.
Furthermore, members of the legal profession are still the custodians of
a certain tradition. They have invested in the tradition, as noted above, and
their power, prestige, and self-image depend on the viability of the tradition.
Lawyers tend to believe in many aspects of the legal tradition, as suggested
in the discussion of legal fundamentals-the basics of the tradition. It has
also emerged in a certain respect for the integrity of a legal argument. Part
of our tradition is that not all arguments about legal principle are equally
valid. Beyond those aspects of the tradition, we probably have a certain
faith that someone schooled in the tradition of laws and principles gives a
better, more persuasive, deeper, or more thoughtful form of advice, even
when the advice looks closer to the moral and political than to what is
conventionally understood as legal. If we take the best in our tradition
seriously, it will encourage independent professional judgment.

19.

See MODEL

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1981); MODEL RULES

OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
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This bias toward legality can be joined with another approach to encourage independent professional judgment in large law firms: We can
encourage lawyers to bring their independent values from outside clear legal
standards and uncontested legal principles by letting personal morality and
perceptions of public policy play a role in all legal advice. 2 If a polluter
seeks to circumvent anti-pollution controls and the law permits that circumvention, teach lawyers to assert their own interests in pollution control as
a value worth taking seriously. Some of our best writers on the legal
profession have made very persuasive cases for just this approach to
lawyering. 2' Their reaction to the difficulty of finding neutral principles of
legality has not been to abandon principles, but rather to promote those
that might not be safe and neutral. Independent professional judgment can
then mean both the anchoring of advice on legality, where appropriate, and
the implication of the lawyers' own values in legal advice and representation.
The good teacher, in short, can cultivate professional values in two ways
that counter the manipulation of legal doctrine and the iconoclastic realist
questioning. One responsibility is to show where certain icons are located
and how they affect legal advice. The second is to insist that we ask what
we ought to advise given our own perceptions of morality and public policy.
If law schools promote these approaches, then their graduates will be aware
that the many virtues of problem solving do not necessarily mean that
economic rationality is all that matters from the point of view of fidelity
to the legal system and fidelity to personal values.
The question is whether these two approaches toward educating lawyers
really can help promote significant professional values in the large firm
setting. It might be, after all, that the economic necessities of the competition
for clients make concerns with legality or personal integrity beside the point.
Clients want particular results or they go elsewhere. We must ask, therefore,
about corporate behavior when confronted with each approach. If the
corporate client in the antitrust hypothetical simply states that he or she
could care less about the so-called fundamentals of professional responsibility and the legal system, there is not much a lawyer can do except give
in or withdraw and let the business go elsewhere.
Corporate behavior, however, is not focused entirely on short-term profits.
The advice given consistent with fundamental legal principles is tied into a
lawyer's professional image, but it also implicates widely shared values that
go beyond the profession. The lawyer who advises clients to pay particular
attention to due process, for example, or the dictates of a clearly applicable

20. It is quite possible, as Mr. Fitzpatrick has indicated in a personal communication, that
a problem-solving lawyer could be at least as likely as a promoter of legality to insert personal
morality and long-term thinking into legal advice.
21. Gordon, supra note 1; Luban, supra note 1; Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589 (1985); Simon, supra note 1.

1989]

LEGAL EDUCATION

statute, is acting consistent with a strong body of public opinion. One of
the striking features of the Iran-Contra Affair was the extraordinary attention paid to the question of legality. The same was true with respect to the
investigations of former Attorney General Meese. Each situation could have
been approached in a much more "sophisticated" way, but the public (or
at least the media) focused predominantly on the narrow question of legality.
Lawyers who keep that approach in front of their clients despite the pressures
for short-term profits are not out of the mainstream.
Moreover, public opinion is not static and unrelated to developments
within the law schools and the legal profession. What law schools teach
and how law schools react to public events can affect public opinion. If we
are consistent in proclaiming and explaining certain fundamentals in changing contexts, our legal expertise and presumed competence will have some
impact on the public. 22 The public may continue to perceive us as the
custodians of at least some fundamental American values, 23 and thus perceive
us as worthy of support against deprofessionalizing pressures.
But will this logic work with the effort to bring personal morality into
our legal advice? This approach is more political and divorced from fundamental principles of legality. Thus, it is harder to predict success in this
effort to put independent professional judgment into large firm practice.
One problem is that legal advisers have no particular claim to expertise or
insight about these non-legal concerns. If the advice gets in the way of
business judgments, we cannot expect the business client to be as indulgent
or respectful as when legality concerns inform the judgment. The business
client may be even more inclined to take the business elsewhere, even to
non-lawyers, if the lawyer will not acquiesce. This kind of legal-moralbusiness advice, however, is defensible in its own terms for the legal
profession and others. Part of good teaching could be that this professional
approach-integrating personal morality with professional practice-cuts
across professions and should be supported by business executives, accountants, and engineers as well. If each one gives advice that is not limited to
short-term profits and losses, then business clients generally will be better
able to accept this kind of professional role. At the very least, this approach
gives clients better access to the unreserved intelligence of their professionals.
The legal profession and the law schools can do more. As others have
emphasized, we can reject one aspect of the professional norms that retains
support in the abstract-the idea that lawyers are in no way responsible for
the actions of their clients. 24 Lawyers have a complicated set of duties, but

22. See Garth, Independent ProfessionalPower and the Search for a Legal Ideology with
a Progressive Bite, 62 IND. L.J. 183 (1987).
23. See AcKEimAN, RECONSTRUCTING AzRicAN LAW (1984).
24. See Gordon, supra note 1; Luhan, supra note 1; Rhode, supra note 21; Simon, supra
note 1.
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clearly no obligation to take particular cases. To say, however, as the Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct do, that legal representation of a client "does
not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities" 25 is to oversimplify dramatically. It would also
oversimplify to say a lawyer only represents clients whom the lawyer thinks
are morally correct. Other systemic values are implicated. The point, however, is that part of our responsibility in the law schools is to question the
division between lawyer and client responsibility. Our questioning can be
discomforting to a person whose law practice leads to representation of
entities whose behavior he or she does not like, but professionalism requires
some introspection and self-criticism. The law schools will have diminished
impact on corporate law firms if they fail to encourage self-criticism and a
sense of personal integrity in practice.
Law schools, in addition, possess the means to encourage professional
responsibility for client actions. As institutions, they can recognize and
reward those who have rejected the artificial divorce between lawyer and
client. Law schools help to decide who will be honored most within the
legal profession. We teach students what we consider to be the standards
for top lawyers, and we recognize lawyers through alumni awards and the
like. If law schools work to reward careers characterized by professional
excellence and integrity, they will help inspire that career path in others.
What we value in the law schools, moreover, affects value in the marketplace. Law firms develop their own cultures 2 6 with respect to working
conditions and expectations, aggressiveness in litigation, general ethical
approach, willingness to take certain kinds of cases, and public service. The
culture can help create the market value of a firm's services. It may be that
law schools can help promote a market where clients shop not just for a
"yes," but rather for the blessing of a concerned and demanding law firm. 27
This possibility seems at first to be paradoxical. If clients want their
problems solved with a minimum of legally generated friction, why would
they seek out and pay premium dollars for lawyers who make it more
difficult for them? Consider the antitrust example. Suppose one law firm
is known for its concerns with professional ethics and legality, and another
is known as a good source of affirmative recommendations. A corporation
may be convinced that its behavior is consistent with law and the principles
of antitrust, and it wishes its shareholders and the public to appreciate its
position. Perhaps it fears a private legal challenge or a public challenge if

25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1983). As Luban says, "ITihe

principle of neutrality has come under vigorous attack in recent years, and in my view is
completely discredited." Luban, supra note 1, at 738.
26. See Rhode, supra note 21, at 631-38.
27. Simon makes a similar point about how goodness may have a market value. Simon,
supra note 1, at 1130.
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the regulatory climate changes, and it wants to be sure that everyone
understands the legal soundness of the position. It may be efficient to seek
approval from a very demanding law firm. For such transactions, there is
a particular market in legal services. By valuing the kind of lawyer who
cultivates this market, law schools can help create and support a demand
for such services.
Law schools can thus participate in maintaining some important professional values. They can help cultivate the essential components of fundamental legality and encourage responsible advice even beyond the limited
domain of neutral legal principles. That does not mean a rejection of
problem solving or the creativity that helps clients accomplish their goals.
It means working with clients not just to achieve a bottom line result, but
also to respect certain fundamentals and pay attention to important moral
considerations.
A cautious conclusion is in order. My argument has been built on
somewhat fragile foundations; the possibility of success cannot be demonstrated. Maybe the professional values supported here will not continue to
enjoy a supporting consensus, or they may simply be overwhelmed by the
marketplace. Further, it is a little dangerous to try to reach back into the
last century to sustain parts of an ideal that we cannot say for sure ever
existed. A norm supported in the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
does not necessarily describe lawyers' conduct. To some extent, therefore,
my effort can be seen as another example of unsupported professional
nostalgia. The question is far from settled, however, and I would rather
place the burden of proof on the critics of professionalism. It is much more
fun to teach in a law school if we maintain the belief that there are certain
professional values worth professing, and that the cultivation of such values
can accomplish some good.

